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21. Introduction
In 1956 Gunnar Myrdal wrote that the underdeveloped countries' ‘way of handling their commercial
policy will be one of the most significant factors in determining whether they will fail or succeed in their
drive for economic development’ (Myrdal, 1956:254). Despite extensive research, however, economists
and political scientists have not agreed on which commercial policy to recommend. One reason for this
lack of progress is the close and complex linkages between the effect of each country's economic policy
and the structural features of the world economy. Radical social scientists have argued that the
international economic system is systematically rigged against new entrants, and that a policy of
delinking developing countries from advanced nations is necessary. This view has few proponents today,
but the idea that global South-South co-operation is imperative to Third World development is still
alive, cf. the South Commission (1990) and Panchamukhi (1996). Furthermore, according to UNCTAD
(1995) a number of regional co-operation agreements have recently been signed by Third World
countries, and studies sponsored by the World Bank speak of a ‘new wave’ of regionalism (De Melo
and Panagariya, 1993a). The signatory parties of these regional treaties are motivated by the belief that
co-operation and integration will spur development.
In this article I investigate how various trade policies are expected to affect development. My emphasis
is on what the Third World countries can do themselves, and which political obstacles they have to
overcome. I start out by briefly discussing the problems facing these countries in the present
international trading system. Next, I introduce the question of import substitution versus export
promotion, since these competing strategies have dominated much of the development debate so far. The
main parts of the article discuss to what extent South-South co-operation in general and regional
integration in particular, make up a feasible, alternative or supplementary development strategy. The
recent policy debate has been characterised by renewed interest in this issue, and I will review both old
and new literature in the field. The focus will be on the general case, not on particular co-operation
schemes1.
2. Problems with the Present Trade Order
The intellectual underpinning of the World Trade Organisation and the GATT agreement is to a large
extent classical and neo-classical trade theory. According to this theory all countries stand to gain from
participating in international trade. Free trade maximises global output by permitting each country to
specialise in what it does best. At the same time trade enables countries to escape the confines of their
own resource endowment. The gains from trade may be unevenly distributed among countries, but
according to the basic text-book models, no country will be worse off.
3The potential benefits from trade are obvious and well-known. Unfortunately, however, the simple
liberal approach to trade is not consistent with the historical experience of most developing countries.
Although these countries are far from homogeneous, many of them face similar problems under the
present trade order, and there are two general reasons why classical and neo-classical theory does not fit
reality. First, the theory builds on assumptions that are violated in most international markets. Second,
world trade is not, and has never been, genuinely free.
A basic problem with classical and neo-classical theories is the assumption of constant returns to scale
and perfect competition. This is far from the actual situation in any economy, a point heavily
emphasised by the ‘new trade theory’ of the last two decades. The prevalence of intra-industry trade, i.e.
trade in similar products, is difficult to explain in terms of comparative advantage, and product
differentiation seems to be the driving force behind this kind of trade. This implies imperfect
competition as each producer has market power in its own varieties. Furthermore, much of the world
trade is in oligopolistic industries such as cars, chemicals, electronics and steel. The increasing
importance of multinational corporations is another indication that imperfect competition matters, since
a key explanation for the existence of such firms is that they have firm-specific advantages to bring to
their hosts (Smith, 1994).  According to Krugman (1987), the insights of new models incorporating
imperfect competition, learning and economies of scale, has reduced the doctrine of free trade from an
optimal first best strategy to ‘a reasonable rule of thumb’. Note also that Baldwin and Venables (1995)
state that the welfare effects of regional integration arrangements ‘may be many times larger if
industries are imperfectly, rather than perfectly, competitive.’
A related problem is that the theory is static rather than dynamic, with resources assumed to be fixed in
quantity. In reality, relative factor endowments and comparative advantages are not given, but in a state
of permanent change. Moreover, they not only determine, but are also over time determined by, the
pattern of international trade (Todaro, 1992:338). Technology-intensive industries give strong incentives
for innovation and opportunities for accumulation of physical and human capital, whereas an economy
based on primary commodity production gives fewer possibilities for development. A number of
economic mechanisms making the notion of comparative advantage an endogenous phenomenon have
been explored in the ‘new economic geography’ literature, cf. Krugman (1981, 1991, 1995), Krugman
and Venables (1995) and Grossman and Helpman (1991: Ch.7 and 8). These new models have given the
old theories of uneven development a strong formal justification, and they prove that the issue of
optimal trade policies is far more complicated than previously believed by mainstream economists.
4Returning to traditional trade theory, resources are not only assumed to be fixed, but also to be perfectly
mobile within countries. This is of course not the case, as there can be substantial adjustment costs
associated with transferring resources from one sector of the economy to another. Machinery often has
limited alternative value, re-education is necessary, and unemployment is a widespread problem. This
means that a country which has specialised, cannot without costs withdraw from international trade if
its terms of trade deteriorate.
Considering these effects, it is easy to understand that countries which at the moment have their
comparative advantages in the production of primary commodities and low-skill intensive industries are
sceptical to the long-term consequences of free trade. They fear being locked into a production structure
based on low value-added activities. Nearly half the Third World countries earn more than 50 percent of
their export revenue from one single primary commodity, such as coffee, cocoa, or bananas (Todaro,
1992:325). In addition to the problems of vulnerability, low value-added activities and small
development potentials, these economies seem to have experienced a steady downward trend in their
terms of trade over a number of years, although an exact evaluation is theoretically difficult to make
(Gilpin, 1987:277). One explanatory factor is the relatively low income elasticity of demand for primary
products, and the relatively high income elasticity of demand for manufactured products. Thus, when
income rises in rich countries, the demand for food and raw materials from the Third World rises
relatively slowly, whereas the demand for manufactures, produced mainly by developed countries, rises
quite rapidly. This causes the price of primary products to decline relative to manufactures, and the
situation is exacerbated by the propensity of industrialised countries to develop synthetic substitutes for
many commodities produced by developing countries. Moreover, with falling prices the developing
countries are easily caught in a vicious circle. Trying to maintain their export revenues, they increase
their export production and thereby strengthen the downward pressure on prices. The general
vulnerability experienced by economies with a small degree of diversification is also aggravated by the
fact that primary product prices fluctuate widely. The risk associated with such fluctuations is a real
cost not taken into account in the traditional static theory.
Not only do many developing countries depend on few export commodities, but often they also to a
large extent depend on one single foreign market, usually the former colonial power. This increases their
exposure to risk, and studies also show that countries under such circumstances tend to pay more than
the international market price for their imports (Yeats, 1991). This indicates that the competitive
pressure on their import prises is low, something which at least partly is due to the lack of infrastructure
connecting these countries to each other and the world markets.
5Changing focus from market structures to the political aspects of trade, one should note that the present
trade regime is not one of free trade. Industrialised countries often have significant barriers to trade in
those manufacturing industries where developing countries are most likely to be competitive, e.g. light
industries intensive in unskilled labour, such as textiles and footwear. Although the Multifibre
Arrangements and other protectionist measures are to be phased out according to the GATT Uruguay
Round agreement, to what extent this will actually happen remains to be seen. Lack of administrative
capacity is another general problem for most Third World countries. Since many important issues in the
field of trade are negotiated in multilateral bodies, this causes developing country interests to be largely
ignored when the rules of the international trading regime are determined.
Finally, there are distributive effects of trade not much emphasised either by traditional or by new trade
theory. Theories on the political economy of trade policy, on the other hand (cf. Rodrik, 1995a),
emphasise that when countries open up to trade, some groups will lose while others gain. When
traditional trade theory states that ‘countries’ gain from trade, what is meant is that the gains are large
enough to make compensation for the losers possible. However, such redistribution may not be part of
the reform. In that case, it is a matter of value judgement whether or not a social improvement has taken
place.
3. Import Substitution vs. Export Promotion
Much of the old literature on trade and development concerns whether ‘import substitution’ or ‘export
promotion’ is the better strategy. Those in favour of import substitution often view existing trade
patterns as a source of dominance and exploitation. Extensive government intervention in the economy
and protection in the form of tariffs and quotas are considered necessary to break out of the current
world division of labour and to initiate industrialisation and a self-reliant development. Import
substitution can also be viewed as a way of saving foreign exchange or as a prerequisite for later
export-led growth. The economic rationale for this strategy rests heavily on the infant industry
argument. According to this argument, governmental support for an industry may under certain
circumstances be justified on a temporary basis to permit high-cost domestic producers enough time to
learn and gain sufficient economies of scale to become competitive. From a theoretical point of view, it
is not enough, however, to demonstrate that there is a potential for learning and scale economies in a
certain industry. For protection to be defensible, the discounted present value of future social benefits
must outweigh the efficiency loss during the period of protection. Furthermore, there must be reason to
believe that private investors are not able to take advantage of this profit opportunity. Finally, the first-
best policy under such circumstances is subsidies, not trade policy measures (Helleiner, 1992:6-7).
6Ironically, the new trade literature and the new economic geography literature (e.g. Krugman, 1984)
have in some respects given a better formal justification for import substitution strategies than what was
available when this policy was most actively pursued. Despite this fact,  import substitution is still not
recommended by mainstream economists, as it is difficult to find instances in modern times where the
strategy has succeeded. It has clearly promoted the growth of manufacturing, but it does not seem to
have promoted general economic development or well-being (Krugman and Obstfeld, 1997:257-258).
One of the major problems with import substitution strategies is that the market size of a single country
limits the degree of specialisation. In most modern industries there are substantial economies of scale.
Without sacrificing product differentiation, these economies of scale can only be exploited fully when
producing for a fairly large international market. Another problem is the distortions created by tariffs
and other government interventions in the economy. Optimal policies require a large administrative
capacity and a strong government to resist the pressure from rent-seeking lobbies, often consisting of
foreign firms whose co-operation is necessary in setting up local industries. Neither of these two
qualities characterise the average developing country government. Capital intensive industries and
production of advanced consumer goods are also often stimulated at the expense of commodities for
which conditions are more favourable. Multinational corporations and wealthy nationals are in many
instances the main beneficiaries. Moreover, protection reduces the incentives to undertake quality and
productivity improvements, and experience shows that infant industries tend not to ‘grow up’ without a
competitive pressure at some stage. Also, import substituting policies usually weaken the agricultural
sector and the traditional export industries. Since importing key commodities is still necessary, the result
is often balance-of-payment difficulties and increased dependency. If more protective policies are
introduced to remedy these problems, the economy is easily caught in a vicious circle.  At some stage,
then, many countries have been forced to introduce a more outward-oriented strategy in order to earn
foreign exchange for debt service and necessary imports.
Arguments in favour of export promotion are to a large extent arguments against import substitution as
spelled out above. Advocates of the export promotion strategy stress ‘the efficiency and the growth
benefits of free trade, the importance of substituting large world markets for narrow domestic markets,
the distorting price and cost effects of protection and the tremendous success of the East Asian export-
oriented economies of South-Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong’ (Todaro, 1992:370). However,
it is widely agreed that most countries pursuing import substitution have protected their economies more
generally and to a larger extent than the advocates of this strategy would recommend. Furthermore,
simply comparing the East Asian ‘success stories’ with countries pursuing import-substituting strategies
does not prove the liberal case. South Korea and Taiwan have been through periods of extensive import
7substitution which gave them an industrial base, and in all countries except Hong Kong ‘the production
and composition of exports was not left to the market, but resulted from carefully planned intervention
by their governments’ (op.cit.:374). Rodrik (1995b:97) points out that South Korea and Taiwan also
had a relatively skilled workforce and a relatively equal distribution of resources. These general
conditions were conducive to growth, and the  growth was, according to Rodrik, investment-led. Export-
oriented policies were only ‘important in so far as they enabled a steady rise in imported capital goods’.
Moreover, Singapore and Hong Kong are small city states and therefore difficult to compare with other
developing countries. For geopolitical reasons, the four ‘tigers’ also received significant amounts of
foreign support, and even though there are obvious benefits from trade liberalisation in many developing
economies, there are also large social costs incurred in the transition process. These are easily
overlooked.
4. Global South-South Co-operation and Collective Self-Reliance
In response to the difficulties laid out above, various political thinkers concerned with Third World
development have advocated the need for greater South-South co-operation. One can argue analytically
for such an attitude, but it is clear that this point of view has also been ideologically motivated.
Considering the Third World as a group of countries similarly oppressed by former colonial powers and
a biased world economy, a call for solidarity and self-reliance comes naturally to mind. Todaro
(1992:346) puts it this way:
While it may not be possible for many LDCs to be self-reliant on an individual country by
country basis, some form of trade and economic co-operation among equals is probably
preferable to each country trying to ‘go it alone’ in a world of unequal trade, technological
dominance, increasing protectionism among developed nations and various forms of non-market
price determination.
Another recent proponent of this view was the South Commission, an independent group of experts and
politicians from various Third World countries, stating for example that ‘solidarity and co-operation are
imperative for the countries of the South’ (1990:17).
It was with the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement and later UNCTAD2 and the Group of 773
in the 1960s that South-South co-operation on a global scale was put on the international agenda. Partly
inspired by the success of OPEC in the early 1970s, a New International Economic Order became the
main objective, and the United Nations was the natural arena to put forward such demands. With their
large voting majority in the General Assembly the developing countries could in principle push through
any proposal they wanted. A voting majority and a morally superior position, however, were not
enough. By the early 1980s it became clear that the notion of ‘commodity power’ was not rooted in
reality, and Southern demands did not correspond to Southern strengths. Furthermore, the industrialised
8countries continuously moved the international economic negotiations away from the UN organisations
to the Bretton Woods institutions. These disappointing experiences resulted in little interest in South-
South issues for several years. Nevertheless, in the early 1990s, the subject seemed to gain some
renewed interest, cf. the earlier mentioned South Commission. A significant change from earlier co-
operative attempts has been the far more modest role attributed to the UN system. Moreover, co-
operation on a global scale is proposed to start among those countries motivated and financially able,
without waiting for all developing countries to join. The latter proposal has been followed by a group of
the most industrialised developing countries, the so-called G15 (Folke et al., 1992:40).
South-South trade and co-operation have many potential advantages. By trading more with each other
the developing countries will become less dependent on Northern markets and the fluctuations in these
markets. Research also shows that South-South trade is different from, and more technology intensive
than South-North trade (Sabolo, 1983), thereby helping to industrialise and differentiate the Southern
economies. In this way the dependence and vulnerability of the developing countries are reduced. Since
the modest level of South-South trade at present has historical explanations, there is also reason to
believe that these countries have comparative advantages relative to each other which are not fully
utilised. After all, these countries differ widely with respect to resources, technologies and demand.
Compared to North-South trade, Southern countries also have the advantage of proximity to
neighbouring countries, and it seems reasonable to believe that their goods are in many cases better
suited to the needs of other countries on a similar level of development. Increased South-South trade can
also protect these countries from what many perceive to be a negative cultural influence inevitable with
North-South trade. Furthermore, in theory, commodity prices might be stabilised on a higher level
through co-operation. Technology, infrastructure and information are also considered promising fields
for co-operation. Finally, shared marketing and distribution may in some industries make it possible to
bring the commodities closer to the final customers, thereby increasing profit.
Arthur Lewis (1977:77) was among those who expressed great faith in a strategy based on South-South
trade and co-operation, stating that
the LDCs have within themselves all that is required for growth. They have enough land to feed
themselves, if they cultivate it properly. They are capable of learning the skills of manufacturing,
and of saving the capital required for modernization. Their development does not in the long run
depend on the existence of the developed countries, and their potential for growth would be
unaffected even if all the developed countries were to sink under the sea.
This might be true, but it is a regrettable fact that none of the major co-operation efforts have given any
substantial results4. Lack of support from the industrialised countries and difficulties overcoming the
logic of the existing economic order can to some extent explain these failures. One serious obstacle to
9South-South trade is transportation. Most international communication lines are North-North or North-
South. ‘This implies that it is often easier and cheaper to send goods long distance South-North and
North-South than much shorter distances South-South’ (Folke et al., 1992:232). There are also financial
problems, notably the widespread scarcity of foreign exchange. Counter-trade and regional clearing
arrangements have tackled this difficulty with some success, but the problem is exacerbated by
development aid from the North tied to procurement in the donor countries. A related obstacle is the
generous state-sponsored credit terms often offered by exporters from the North. Exporting firms in
developing countries and the states backing them are not in a position to compete in this arena (op.cit.).
Lack of resources for after-sale services is another problem in South-South trade.
Despite these structural problems, it is recognised that most Third World co-operative initiatives have
neither been thwarted by difficulties with the existing economic order, nor by a lack of support from
industrialised countries. A World Bank study by Erzan (1989) concludes that ‘the structure of tariff and
non-tariff protection in most developing countries discriminates against products which could be
competitively supplied from other developing countries.’ As stated by Cizelj (1983:17), then, there is
obviously ‘a substantial gap between the declared common interest of all developing countries on one
hand, and their everyday operational policies on the other’. He considers lack of solidarity among
partners and a preference for domination rather than interdependence to be one important explanation
for the failures. As is stressed by many writers, the Third World is not ‘one world’ but a large number
of different countries with different history, culture, level of income, security needs, conditions in the
world markets and with different goals. Obviously then, conflicting interests exist, and there is no
reason to expect solidarity. A simple illustration is the fact that big and small producers of the same
commodity do not easily keep together. Moreover, many of the NICs, such as Brazil, Taiwan and
Singapore, are not even members of the Non-Aligned Movement and are often unsympathetic to G77
opinions on North-South issues (Bhagwati, 1984:11). Without full participation from the more
developed countries like these, any bid for increased power by the Third World will be fatally
handicapped.
The areas of joint interest among partner countries are usually bigger at regional, and especially at
subregional levels of co-operation than is the case at the interregional level (Cizelj, 1983:17).
Furthermore, the potential advantages from such co-operation are much the same as under global
schemes. This makes regional integration an interesting strategy to explore, and particularly so as a
wave of ‘new regionalism’ seems to have emerged over the last decade (De Melo and Panagariya,
1993b).
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5. Regional Integration among Developing Countries
The early success of the European Economic Community demonstrated how effective economic
integration can be, and prompted many Third World countries to seek similar gains within their own
regions. A large number of such regional organisations were formed. UNCTAD (1995), listing
subregional, regional and interregional economic co-operation and integration groupings with Third
World participation, names 58 such agreements. 50 of these are pure South-South agreements and  47
are treaties at a subregional or regional level5. All continents and a very large number of countries are
represented on the list.
The records of the various early regional arrangements have in general not been encouraging6. In part
this is due to what Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990:2) call a ‘fallacy of transposition’. Governments of
developing countries misunderstood the European process ‘as a case of limited co-operation without
surrendering national sovereignty, and tried to copy the example in their countries’. However, many
initial conditions conducive to integration in Europe were overlooked, e.g. a high level of intraregional
trade before integration, similarities in income and industrialisation levels allowing for intraindustry
specialisation, corresponding interests in foreign affairs, and willingness and capability to provide
compensation payments. Despite difficulties with previous attempts, however, a renewed interest for
regional integration schemes has been observed in the 1990s, and 13 of the existing co-operation or
integration schemes listed in UNCTAD (1995) have been formed during the last decade. The perceived
dynamism of the European integration process probably forms part of the explanation this time as well.
Uncertainty about the future of GATT may also have contributed.
The integration process can be classified according to the kind of discrimination removed. Following
Balassa (1961) it is common to distinguish between five stages (in Kahnert et al., 1969):
a) the free trade area, which implies the removal of quantitative restrictions and customs
tariffs;
b) the customs union, which unifies the tariff of the countries within the area against
outsiders;
c) the common market, where all restrictions on factor movements within the area are
abolished;
d) the economic union, where economic, monetary, fiscal, social and counter-cyclical
policies are to some extent harmonised;
e) the supranational union, where the respective governments abandon completely their
sovereignty over the policies listed above and a supranational authority issues binding
decisions.
In practice, preferential trading arrangements are also often considered to be a case of integration, at a
lower level than free trade areas7.
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An important contribution to the welfare analysis of economic integration was made by Jacob Viner
(1950), introducing the distinction between trade-creating and trade-diverting customs unions. Trade
creation is the replacement of high-cost domestic production by lower-cost imports from partner
countries. Prices will be lowered for consumers and their standard of living increases. On the other
hand, previous exporters outside the union still having to pay tariffs may not be able to compete with
internal manufactures whose goods circulate duty-free inside the union. This is trade diversion.
Consumption may be shifted away from low-cost external suppliers to higher-cost producers in partner
countries. From a world welfare point of view, trade creation is considered welfare-increasing while
trade diversion is considered welfare-reducing. To what extent trade creation will outweigh trade
diversion depends on a number of factors, such as the degree of overlap between goods produced in
member states and the degree of pre-union reliance on trade from outside the region (Carl, 1986:6).
Viner's conclusion has been much discussed by later economists, and as stated by De Melo et al. (1993),
‘the literature is full of "anything may happen" type of results’. Kemp and Wan (1976), however,
proved that under perfect competition it is always possible to design a free-trade area which is welfare
improving for the member countries and which does not alter the welfare of the non-members. In the
spirit of this analysis, De Melo et al. (1993) show that welfare-improving free trade areas can also be
designed in the presence of quantitative trade restrictions. De Melo and Panagariya (1993b) argue that
this is of particular importance for developing countries, as quantitative restrictions prevail in virtually
all South-South integration schemes.
An interesting and important topic is how regional integration arrangements affect non-member
countries if one assumes imperfect competition. Baldwin and Venables (1995) investigate this issue and
point to what they call ‘production shifting’ as a mechanism which may have a negative welfare effect
on non-members. This occurs because firms inside an integrating region, due to reduced trade costs, get
an advantage in partner countries relative to firms in non-member countries. Hence, the profit of firms
in member countries increases relative to the profit of firms in non-member countries. This induces
entry of firms within the integrating region and exit of outside firms.  A similar point is made by
Melchior (1997:133) stating that ‘integration is a gentle way of prospering at the cost of the others’.
The negative effect of integration on outside countries is, however, a theoretical result, and to my
knowledge no one has assessed whether it is quantitatively important in a Third World context. Haaland
and Norman (1992) and Baldwin, Forslid and Haaland (1996), however, estimate welfare effects of the
1992 European ‘single market’ on other OECD countries. They find a negative, but modest impact on
outside countries. Based on this result, it does not seem likely that much smaller Third World regional
arrangements should have an important impact on non-member countries8. Furthermore, it is not
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obvious that possible negative effects on non-members should be of concern to developing countries
trying to improve their economic performance. As stated by OECD (1993:15) ‘It does not seem
convincing that regional trade liberalisation should be held back because third countries are not
similarly outward-oriented.’
6. Potential Benefits of Integration in the Third World
Among potential economic benefits from integration one can distinguish between ‘once-and-for-all’
benefits from trade liberalisation on one hand, and dynamic effects on the other. Increased trade within
the integrating area will improve the resource allocation and create growth. However, most writers seem
to agree that the static trade-creating effects of integration are limited at low levels of development.
Even though these traditional gains can be of importance in some regions, they are well known and
previously discussed. Hence, here I will focus on the longer-run dynamic effects. There are also
potential non-economic benefits that can be important.
Foremost among the assumed dynamic economic benefits of integration has been the ‘training ground’
effect. For many less developed countries, and particularly for those with very small domestic markets,
regional economic integration may offer a valuable experience, helping the transition to a more balanced
development and a more open economy (Robson, 1987:196). Within a regional setting both quality and
marketing techniques can improve and promote diversification and export production at a later stage. A
related benefit accrues from economies of scale. ‘These economies occur in investment costs, in some
types of operating costs and through such phenomena as learning by doing’ (Kahnert et al., 1969:128).
Integration will increase the market size and where economies of scale are present, reduce the cost per
unit. This will benefit customers in the integrated market as well as enhance export production. Note,
however, that the training-ground argument is the basic rationale behind infant industry protection and
traditional import-substituting development strategies. Even though the argument is important and fits
well with new trade theories, a warning can be appropriate. Previous integration schemes, particularly
in Latin America, were to a large extent seen as means of making import-substitution less costly in
terms of efficiency losses. It is widely agreed that these attempts did not succeed.
According to Thomsen (1994), host country market size is one of the strongest determinants of where
foreign firms invest. Hence, by reducing the trade barriers within a region, prospective investors can be
offered a larger market, making investments more profitable. This improved ability to attract capital and
technology has been another key reason for integration among developing countries (Carl, 1986:6), and
the experience of Mexico within NAFTA, and of Portugal and Spain within the EC, demonstrates that
integration can have a positive effect on investments (Baldwin and Venables, 1995). Note that the view
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on the role of foreign investments has changed over the last decades. Whereas many host country
governments and some economists in the 1970s thought that the main effect of multinational
corporations was to create monopoly situations which exploited the local economy and hampered
development, the mainstream opinion in the 1990s is much more optimistic. Multinationals may have
important complementarities with local industry, and a number of econometric studies seem to support
the view that foreign direct investment creates knowledge spillovers or demonstration effects which
stimulate growth (Markusen and Venables, 1997). In theory, integration should also promote efficiency
in the allocation of investments between member countries. However, the harmonised investment climate
and increased political and macroeconomic stability resulting from a successful integration process, are
probably more important.
Joint production of public goods is another potential benefit since there are often economies of scale in
the public sector and some public goods can only be produced by an international community. Strictly
speaking, this is in most instances a matter of co-operation, possible without integration, but the close
relationship between integrated economies can make it easier for politicians to reach agreements.
Traditionally, integration schemes have concentrated on joint production of public services, education,
research and physical infrastructure (Langhammer and Hiemenz, 1990:8). An example of this is the
East African Community which created a group of corporations to operate the railroads, harbours, post
offices and telecommunication systems (Carl, 1986:35). According to the new growth theory, human
capital formation is an important factor in explaining growth, and institution-building and joint training
therefore seem to be particularly promising fields of co-operation (De Melo et al., 1992:40). With
respect to institution building, one should note that existing integration schemes have recently given
increasing attention to joint exploitation of deep sea mineral resources, fishing regulations and
management of other environmental resources, e.g. wildlife protection (Langhammer and Hiemenz,
1990:8). Defence is another field where there may be large gains from co-operation, but this is likely to
take place at an advanced stage only. With respect to customs unions, there are also obvious gains from
reduced costs of administrating the countries' customs services. These are often ignored, but can be
substantial, particularly for small developing countries (Gunter, 1989:20-21). Moreover, there are
substantial savings in reduced paper work for economic agents within the integrated area and for trading
partners outside, having to relate only to one regional customs agency instead of one in each of the
member countries.
Another benefit from the public domain is that regional commitments may help to discipline the
domestic political opposition. Policies, e.g. sector specific tariffs or subsidies, which may benefit
relatively small, but well organised interest groups at the expense of the majority, can be shifted to
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supranational bodies (op.cit.). Other public tasks can in effect become more decentralised. Corruption is
a devastating problem in many Third World countries, and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that
political competition, i.e. a system where several agencies provide the same service, can reduce the level
of corruption. Economic and political integration may be one way of creating such a system. By
harmonising regulations, various licences can be mutually accepted across national borders. Charging
bribes will then become more difficult since economic agents being asked for an illegal fee have the
possibility of obtaining the licence elsewhere.
Reduced vulnerability has been an important rationale for increased South-South trade in general, and
this argument is valid also on a regional basis. The effect can be somewhat reduced by the fact that
neighbouring economies usually have similar features and might therefore move through booms and
slumps together. However, this may be compensated by improved availability of resources and a more
secure market access under a successful integration scheme as compared to a global system of trade
preferences. The formation of regional integration arrangements are by Hindley and Messerlin
(1993:360) interpreted as ‘insurance policies against an uncertain and threatening future’, i.e. a future
with increased protectionism. Even though the future may seem less threatening after the closure of the
GATT Uruguay Round, protectionist forces are still strong in the major markets. Furthermore, the
general problem of dependency has not changed. Improved bargaining power is therefore another
argument for regional integration among developing countries. Larger economic units have more power
in the international community, but too much should not be expected at this level. Even though groups
of countries may have a stronger voice than individual countries, the impact of the Third World is in
any case limited, as demonstrated by the debate on the New International Economic Order during the
1970s. With respect to negotiations on tariff concessions, though, better deals might be possible as
larger markets are more attractive than small markets. Furthermore, by pooling resources, better
expertise can be devoted to such negotiations. Cartelisation is another possibility. Neighbouring
countries tend to belong to the same climatic belt or geological area, and therefore often export the same
commodities to the world markets. However, although maintaining cartel discipline might be easier on a
regional than on a global level, it is still known to be difficult. Moreover, usually there are other
producers or potential entrants outside the region further complicating the policy. A more promising
field is for integration to strengthen the bargaining power vis-à-vis  multinational corporations.
Harmonisation of incentive structures and tax policies may enable member countries to avoid loss of
income to such corporations arising from competitive tax concessions which they offer in their bid to
attract foreign direct investment (Balasubramanyam, 1989:181). The discipline problem may be less in
this area as tax structures are not as easy to change as export volumes.
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Puga and Venables (1996) analyse South-South regional integration formally, drawing on the new
economic geography literature. In the model of Puga and Venables there is imperfect competition with
four forces determining profitability and thereby the location of firms. First, a large number of
manufacturing firms in a country or location drive up wages. Second, given some trade barriers, a large
number of manufacturing firms drive down product prices. These are standard neo-classical forces that
induce firms to locate where industrial activity is low. Third, however, being in a developed location
means that one has easy access to specialised intermediate inputs because of the large number of firms
in the same location. This reduces costs. Fourth, demand is larger in a developed location, and this also
increases profits. These cost and demand linkages are pecuniary externalities which induce firms to set
up in the same location as existing firms. Knowledge spillovers and access to specialised labour are
other cost-reducing effects of being located in a developed area. If such forces are powerful compared to
the neo-classical ones, this may explain why we observe agglomeration of manufacturing in a subset of
countries, and it means that if a development process gets started, it might become self-reinforcing.
Within this framework, unilateral liberalisation will on the  one hand increase product market
competition from foreign firms and reduce profits. On the other hand, intermediate inputs can be
imported more cheaply, something which increases profitability. In the model of Puga and Venables
(op.cit.), the last effect dominates and unilateral liberalisation will help industrialisation.
Turning to South-South integration, still within the model of Puga and Venables, this will also induce
industrialisation, but through a different mechanism, namely through increased local demand9. Whether
unilateral liberalisation or South-South integration is the better strategy depends on the strength of the
forward linkages resulting from cheaper imports, compared to the increase in demand resulting from
integrating into another Southern market. Simulations on their stylised model indicate that South-South
integration is better than both unilateral liberalisation and South-South integration combined with
liberalisation. These results are based on several assumptions, most notably that the Southern
economies are not too small. This simply imply that creating a large ‘home’ market is critical to the
success of integration, and when a sufficient market size cannot be achieved, protection should be very
modest. The reason for this is that most of the production will have to be exported if the integrated
market is small. Protection and thereby reduced competition will then only have a minor effect on
profits, whereas access to cheap imports is still as important. The analysis, however, also shows that
from the point of view of a Southern economy, South-South integration is inferior to North-South
integration, and I will return to this below.
A positive effect of integration, not mentioned above, is that it can speed up adoption of new
technologies by the least developed regions or countries. Furthermore, it may give these members access
16
to more advanced institutions and policy instruments. This can of course take place within South-South
integration schemes, but the potential for technology transfer is much bigger within integration schemes
involving both developing and developed countries. North-South integration is rare, but De Melo et al.
(1992), studying NAFTA, find evidence of  such ‘catch-up’ effects. At first sight, this may seem to
counteract the analysis of Puga and Venables (1996) as agglomeration forces in their model draw firms
into already developed countries. These agglomeration forces, however, are strongest at intermediate
levels of trade barriers, and it is presumably such ‘intermediate levels’ of barriers that account for the
present unbalanced location of industries between North and South (cf. also Krugman and Venables,
1995). The intuition behind this is that when trade costs are prohibitive, economic activity will have to
be spread out. As trade costs are reduced, taking advantage of the positive externalities associated with
agglomeration becomes more attractive, and a circular process leading to regional differentiation starts.
When trade costs are further reduced, however, factor price differences will at some point start to
dominate, and the periphery will again become industrialised. Regional integration between developed
and developing countries corresponds to trade barriers being reduced from an intermediate to a low
level, and as mentioned above, Puga and Venables' simulations indicate that North-South integration, if
possible, is better than South-South integration from the point of view of the Southern economies.
Within their framework, the driving forces are improved access to large Northern markets and improved
supply of intermediate goods due to lower tariffs. These forces are offset by increased import
competition in the domestic market, but the overall effect is positive.
According to the model simulations of Puga and Venables North-South integration may be welfare-
reducing for the Northern countries. This, however, is not a general result, and besides, these countries
may lose more by staying closed while the Southern economies liberalise amongst themselves.
Furthermore, a smaller wage difference between North and South is likely to reduce the migration
pressure and hence be attractive to Northern countries on that account. Whalley (1993) and Winters
(1993) add to this subsidiary objectives such as increased political influence and the adoption of
advantageous institutions by Southern partners, e.g. with respect to environmental protection.
7. Barriers to Integration
The strategy of regional integration may look good on paper. As mentioned earlier, however, the
progress and achievements of most integration schemes among developing countries have been less than
satisfactory. Langhammer and Hiemenz (1990:13-17) make a distinction between natural barriers,
political barriers, economic barriers and politico-economic barriers. Natural barriers may be rooted in
geographic conditions or historical developments and have in common that they are constraints to
integration outside the responsibility of partner countries. Transportation costs, or communication costs
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in general, are important examples. Differences in language and culture can also complicate the
integration process as well as different legal and administrative traditions. Difficulties of integration
across anglophone and francophone areas in Africa illustrate this. Such barriers are not prohibitive,
though, as demonstrated by the European Union.
Many of the natural barriers can clearly be traced back to the colonial era, but this heritage may also
help integration among neighbouring countries having been part of the same colonial empire. The
relatively most successful integration schemes have been those which could sustain the integration level
inherited from the colonial period, such as the West African Economic Community and the Central
African Customs and Economic Union (op.cit.:18). On the other hand, many developing countries are in
the process of finding a national identity. Such a search for identity can constitute a political obstacle to
integration. This applies particularly to African and Asian countries which have aimed at neutralising
problems of multiracial and multitribal societies through a common umbrella of a national state
(op.cit.:14). The tensions and numerous military conflicts between many developing countries are
obviously also a devastating barrier to integration, whether they are rooted in nationalism, strategic
considerations or both. Differences in ideology or economic philosophy can also be a major obstacle as
was shown in East Africa in the case of Kenya and Tanzania (op.cit.:15) or within the ASEAN,
particularly between Singapore and Indonesia (Balasubramanyam, 1989:177).
The most important barriers to integration are probably at the economic or ‘politico-economic’ level. A
quantitative assessment of gains and losses of integration from a national point of view is very difficult
to make as considerable conceptual and practical problems are involved. Unfortunately the losses are
more tangible and immediate than the gains which first materialise during the course of the process
(Folke et al., 1992:117-118). Delayed or postponed reductions of trade barriers between integrating
economies are therefore among the most important reasons why Third World integration schemes have
failed (De Melo et al., 1992:5), and disputes over the location of industry and design of compensation
schemes for perceived losers in the arrangements have been quite common (Puga and Venables, 1996).
Both experience and the theories of new economic geography show that liberalisation of trade may
accentuate existing inequalities. In regional groupings where the distribution of industries has been left
to the market forces, development has tended to favour regions and states with relatively high per capita
incomes or relatively large domestic markets (Robson, 1987:201-202). This is exactly what the
theoretical model of Puga and Venables (1996) predicts. Under all integration schemes analysed, one of
the two Southern economies in their model industrialise before the other, but the resulting differences
are transitional if the integration process is taken far enough. It means, however, that a strong
momentum is needed to get the process started, and that the various steps should be carefully planned so
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as to start out with integration projects whose benefits are visible at an early stage. Furthermore, one
should explicitly identify allies and pressure groups which are in favour of integration (Vaitsos,
1978:744) and try to compensate groups who stand to lose.
Even if liberalisation and integration do not cause poor regions or countries to become poorer in
absolute terms, different growth rates between neighbouring countries can also be an obstacle. As
argued by the realists, individual well-being is not necessarily the key interest of states. Instead,
‘survival and independence constitute their core interest’ (Grieco, 1990:39). Driven by these interests,
states are acutely sensitive to erosion of relative capabilities. If the realists are correct, and they
probably are to some extent, states are ‘defensive positionalists’ and this ‘may act as a constraint on the
willingness of states to work together even in the face of common interests’ (op.cit.:40). The reason is
that ‘increasingly powerful partners in the present could use their additional power to pressure them or,
at the extreme, to become all the more formidable foes at some point in the future’ (op.cit.). Politicians
might also evaluate integration on the basis of their own utility and for example bend to the demands of
their own electorate, possibly at the expense of national welfare (Langhammer and Hiemenz, 1990:16).
Distributive difficulties are exacerbated by lost government revenues resulting from the elimination of
intra-union tariffs. Customs duties may account for a large portion of total government revenues,
particularly in the least developed countries, and experience has shown that ‘integration will not work
unless some compensatory mechanisms are built in to help the poorest member states’ (Carl, 1986:20).
Several devices can be and have been used for this purpose. From a theoretical point of view, income
transfers, e.g. through development banks, would be the best instrument. According to Vaitsos
(1978:749), however, fiscal compensation has proved neither appropriate nor politically acceptable.
Regional industrial policy and agreed specialisation is another possibility, but the record of
governmental industrial planning is not the best. A final possibility is investment programmes in
infrastructure, technology assimilation, development of managerial and technical skills, marketing
studies and so on (Vaitsos, 1978:749). Bjorvatn (1998) points to improved quality of infrastructure as a
particularly promising policy to promote regional equality. It is also important that liberalisation
schemes include not only the manufacturing sector, but agriculture and raw materials, too, since these
are the sectors where backward countries have their largest potential for short-term expansion.
8. Conclusion
Trade can increase welfare and strongly stimulate growth, but unilateral liberalisation is not likely to
have all the advantages described by traditional trade theory. The development process cannot
meaningfully be viewed as a case of comparative statics, as there is a danger that less developed
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countries will be locked into a production structure based on primary commodities with little potential
for innovation and growth. On the other hand, strong and long-term protection is even worse than
unilateral liberalisation and has proved to be a serious impediment to development in many countries.
Various forms of South-South co-operation have been considered a middle way between these two
development strategies. With respect to general South-South co-operation, a pragmatic and selective
approach seems to be necessary. The developing countries are too different and have too many
conflicting interests for global South-South co-operation and collective self-reliance to be a viable
strategy. Regional integration is a more promising and realistic strategy, even though integration, too, is
a process fraught with tension and conflict. The dismal results of previous integration schemes have not
primarily been due to a misunderstanding of the potential benefits. The main problem seems to have
been a lack of will to implement the necessary policies, and there are several lessons to learn from these
earlier efforts. First, regional integration is not an alternative to trade with the rest of the world, and it
cannot offset the disadvantages of an excessive import substitution strategy. Second, some groups will
lose out in the integration process, and the advantages are mainly long term, particularly for poor
countries. Resistance from various interest groups and poor regions should therefore be expected, and
one should actively seek allies in favour of the process and start with projects having visible positive
effects. Compensation schemes for weaker partners are also of utmost importance. Third, there might be
catch-up and stabilising effects for developing countries integrating into developed country markets if
this is geographically and politically possible. In cases not ready for integration, there can be significant
gains from regional co-operation, and such co-operation should also be stressed within ordinary
integration schemes. Infrastructure, education, research, environment, defence, international
negotiations and regulation of the multinational corporations are all promising fields in this respect.
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Notes
                                                  
1. Cf. OECD (1993) for an evaluation of the historical experience with specific regional trading
arrangements among developing countries. For studies evaluating future prospects of integration in
particular regions, cf. part II of De Melo and Panagariya (1993a).
2. UNCTAD is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. It was established due to Third
World dissatisfaction with the post-war international economic arrangements of the Bretton Woods
system. The first conference was held in 1964. Between the periodic conferences held every three to four
years, day-to-day activities are handled by the UNCTAD Secretariat. A recent result considered important
by the proponents of a global South-South strategy is the GSTP agreement labelled ‘a historic event for
the Third World’ (Linnemann, 1992). The idea of a ‘General System of Trade Preferences’ among
developing countries was formally proposed to form part of the Economic Co-operation among
Developing Countries (ECDC) program in 1976. The agreement became effective in 1989. However, the
trade liberalisation implicit in the first round of negotiations within the GSTP was not very significant.
‘As of now, the GSTP is largely of symbolic value’ (The South Commission, 1990:175).
3. The G77 originated at the 1963 session of the UN General Assembly where a ‘Joint Declaration of the
Developing Countries’ was signed by 75 countries. Membership has increased far beyond 100, but the
group became permanently named the Group of 77.
4. With respect to trade volumes, South-South trade can roughly be divided into three periods (Folke et.al.,
1992:18-20). Between 1945 and 1972 South-South trade grew in absolute terms, but decreased in percent
of world trade. Between 1973 and 1981 it also grew in relative terms and regained former importance.
After 1981 its relative importance decreased once more, mainly due to the debt crisis and declining
revenues from oil exports which also reduced the momentum created by the OPEC member states. In the
late 1980s, however, South-South trade expanded again, owing to the continuous growth in the NICs.
According to UNCTAD (1995) South-South trade accounted for 9.7 percent of total world trade in 1992.
38.8 percent of  total Southern exports went to other Southern countries, and 37.5 percent of total
Southern imports came from other Southern countries.
5. Historically, the Latin American countries have had the most positive view on preferential treatment of
neighbouring countries. In Latin America regional integration was mainly intended to surmount the limits
to import substitution. Sub-Saharan Africa had a completely different point of departure. These countries
had at the outset a high level of institutional integration since large colonial entities sharing language, tax
system, tariffs, currencies, infrastructure etc. had been split into politically independent units. At
independence, these economies were fragile and threatened by the priority of new governments for
national autonomy. In the Middle East and Asia the situation was again different. Here, extreme
heterogeneity of the countries with respect to market size, resource endowment and level of income as well
as conflicting religious and political systems, made common targets difficult to define (Langhammer and
Hiemenz, 1990:1). According to Cizelj, writing in 1983, more than 80 developing countries were involved
in about 30 integration processes at that time. Martin (1992:73) counting regional integration schemes as
well as regional co-operative institutions in Africa alone, estimates the number to be more than 200.
6. De Melo and Panagariya (1993b) find that only five among the many South-South arrangements signed
during the 1960s had a share of intra-regional exports in total exports above four percent, whereas all
North-North arrangements came above this threshold. Furthermore, only one of the South-South
arrangements experienced a noticeable, though temporary, increase in intra-regional exports.
7. Note that all integration schemes run against the most-favoured-nation clause of the GATT Article I.
However, prohibition of regional integration was not considered desirable, and such schemes were instead
considered a ‘supplemental, practical route to the universal free trade that GATT favoured as the ultimate
goal’ (Bhagwati, 1991:66). The GATT article XXIV, therefore, provides an exception to the non-
discriminatory principle in Article I for free-trade associations and customs unions. One argument in
favour of this is according to Blackhurst and Henderson (1993:410) that trade liberalisation in a
geographic region which includes several countries resembles the elimination of barriers to trade between
the states or provinces within a country. In both cases closer regional integration in itself does not make
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the region less integrated with the rest of the world, hence it cannot be considered an inherent threat to
global economic integration. There appears, however, not to be any consensus with respect to whether
regionalism aids or counteracts multilateral efforts to achieve free world trade. Those sceptical towards
regional integration fear that it implies a fragmentation of the world economy into competing trade blocks
(Bhagwati, 1993).
8. This is not to say that regional integration among industrialised countries may not have significant
negative effects on developing countries, a widely held concern which was evaluated by OECD (1993:91).
The report concluded, however, that the ‘contention that regional trading arrangements are leading to
increasingly regionalised trade is not born out by the data ... for the developing country groupings,
regional trade with the highly economically integrated regions - the OECD regions - has been the most
stable of all.’ This was based on an analysis of data from 1966 to 1989, but it does of course not prove that
other harmful effects than reduced trade may not exist. A further investigation of this issue is beyond the
scope of this article.
9. Cf. Bjorvatn (1998) for a different economic geography model formally analysing South-South economic
integration. Bjorvatn shows that reduced transportation costs foster regional balance in economic activity
and income.
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